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2.Summary
Everyone produces disfluencies when they speak spontaneously. However, whereas
most disfluencies pass unnoticed, the repetitions, blocks and prolongations produced
by stutterers can have a severely disruptive effect on communication. The causes of
stuttering have proven hard to pin down - researchers differ widely in their views on
the cognitive mechanisms that underlie it. The present chapter presents initial research
which supports a view (Vasic and Wijnen, this volume) that places the emphasis
firmly on the self-monitoring system, suggesting that stuttering may be a consequence
of over-sensitivity to the types of minor speech error that we all make. 
Our study also allows us to ask whether the speech of people who stutter is perceived
as qualitatively different from that of nonstutterers, when it is fluent and when it
contains similar types of minor disfluencies. Our results suggest that for closely
matched, naturally occurring segments of speech, listeners rate the speech of stutterers
as more disfluent than that of nonstutterers.
3.Introduction
Research into stuttering often seems to fall at the first hurdle: that of defining what
constitutes a stutter, in contrast to the disfluent speech that everyone produces.  As of
yet there is no consensus on a formal definition: researchers such as Perkins (1995)
emphasise the speaker's feelings of loss of control; others, such as Postma and Kolk
(1993), prefer definitions in terms of the frequencies of particular types of disfluency.
However, a consensus is slowly emerging that some of the symptoms associated with
stuttering can be accounted for within a model of speech developed to account for
normal hesitations, speech errors, and self-corrections (e.g., Levelt, 1983).
In this chapter, we provide initial evidence that stutterers appear to be oversensitive
when assessing disfluencies common to both nonstuttering and stuttering speakers.
Our research supports a view  (Vasic and Wijnen, this volume) which emphasises the
role of self-monitoring in the production of stuttered speech.
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1.Self-monitoring in stuttering
Self-monitoring can be described as “the process of inspecting one’s own speech and
taking appropriate action when errors are made” (Hartsuiker & Kolk, 2001).  Levelt’s
(1983, 1989) theory assumes that both overt speech and an internal speech plan are
monitored.  Postma (2000) summarises a number of common speech errors and
identifies evidence for two types of self-monitoring: overt speech repairs (where
speakers correct themselves mid-utterance) support the monitoring of external speech,
whereas covert repairs (where there is no overt error, but a repair can be inferred from
a hesitation in the speech output) supply evidence for the internal monitor.  In fact,
evidence suggests that the repair is often ready before the error is articulated (e.g.,
Blackmer & Mitton, 1991), and that errors can be made in the absence of articulatory
activities or spoken output (for example, when imagining that one is articulating a
tongue-twister: Dell & Repka, 1992).  Thus the self-monitoring system would appear
to have components which are distinct from the monitoring of motor systems (such as
articulation) and from the auditory channel.  Importantly, the speech that we produce
has already been affected by self-monitoring; there is no external record of the
original, possibly imperfect, speech plan.
Recent theorists have taken this view on board.  For example, Postma & Kolk (1993)
hypothesise that stuttering results from covert detection and correction of errors in the
articulatory plan through the internal self-monitor.  Covert self-correction would
prevent the speech error from becoming overt, but would, as a side-effect,
compromise the fluency of speech.  Evidence for this Covert Repair Hypothesis is
inconclusive (for details see: Hartsuiker, Kolk and Lickley, this volume; Vasic and
Wijnen, this volume), but still supported by current studies (e.g. Melnicke, Conture
and Ohde, this volume, who suggest that not only phonological encoding, but
syntactic and semantic processes may be impaired in the formulation of speech by
children who stutter).
Blackmer and Mitton (1991) also ascribe a role to monitoring.  According to these
authors, rapid subsyllabic repetitions, a key symptom of stuttering, occur when the
monitor detects a lack of input, and consequently ‘restarts’ previous articulatory
movements.  
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More recently, Wijnen (2000; Vasic & Wijnen, this volume) has placed the emphasis
entirely on the self-monitoring system, by proposing that stuttering is the direct result
of an overvigilant monitor.  Paradoxically, the repairs made often introduce
disfluencies rather than prevent them: “stutterers stutter because they try to avoid it”
(Wijnen, 2000).  Such a view can be easily extended to account for aspects of
stuttering such as context-dependency and linguistic distribution.
These proposals have in common the assumption that stuttering is related to self-
monitoring; they also share, to a greater or lesser degree, the entailment that there is a
continuity between stuttered and normal disfluencies (in contrast to, e.g., Perkins,
1995).  Arguably, the most parsimonious view is that of Vasic and Wijnen (this
volume); since there are no differences in planning processes (Postma & Kolk, 1993)
or timings (Blackmer & Mitton, 1991) between stutterers and nonstutterers, all
differences between the two groups must be attributed to the self-monitor.  Given an
appropriate experimental paradigm, we should be able to find direct evidence for the
self-monitor’s sensitivity in those who stutter.  By a similar process of inference, we
would expect there to be continuity between the speech of stutterers and nonstutterers:
it is not errors in planned speech, but how many repairs are initiated, which
differentiates the two groups.
2.Sensitivity of the self-monitor
According to Vasic and Wijnen, there are three specific ways in which the speech
monitor may be ‘over-sensitive’ to (potential) speech errors.  Firstly, too much
cognitive effort may be invested in monitoring.  Secondly, the focus (as distinct from
effort) of the monitoring system may be rigid and unadaptive.  Thirdly, the threshold
of the monitor may be too low: a ‘hypersensitivity’ to minor speech distortions that
non-stutterers would tolerate (or in other words regard as within the bounds of
‘normal’ speech) increases the likelihood of stuttering.  The first two assertions are
addressed in Vasic and Wijnen’s chapter; in this chapter we focus on the third.
There are three basic proposals for the nature of the self-monitoring system.  The first
(Levelt, 1983, 1989) supposes that the mechanisms (at the conceptual, phonetic, and
auditory levels) which understand language produced by others are shared with the
self-monitoring system.  The second (Laver, 1973, 1980) assumes multiple
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monitoring devices attuned specifically to production, including the potential to
monitor the articulatory motor processes themselves.  A third view (MacKay, 1987,
1992a,b) suggests that error awareness arises from the prolonged activation of
otherwise uncomitted nodes in the system for speech production.  In an extensive
review, Postma (2000) concludes that current evidence largely favours the view of
Levelt (1983, 1989) in which the systems responsible for language perception and for
self-monitoring are shared.  If we accept this view, then people who stutter should
show increased sensitivity to disfluencies in others’, as well as their own, speech. In
the simplest case, this sensitivity would be manifest whatever the provenance of the
disfluent speech -- i.e., whether it is uttered by a stutterer or a nonstutterer.
The current study addresses this issue by eliciting, from a group of stutterers and a
comparison group of non-stutterers, ratings of the ‘severity of disfluency’ of recorded
speech fragments.  The fragments are excerpted from recordings made of dialogues
between pairs of stutterers, and between matched pairs of nonstutterers.  This allows
us to simultaneously address the second, continuity, assumption of many single-
model accounts.   Few studies have directly assessed the sensitivity of people who
stutter to dysfluency in the speech of others. Postma and Kolk (1992) come close, by
comparing the abilities of people who stutter and fluent subjects to detect errors
(rather than disfluencies) in sequences of CV and VC syllables produced by another
speaker. Their finding was that people who stutter were less successful than controls
in detecting errors under these conditions. In addition, they found that the two groups
did not differ in their ability to detect their own errors in the production of CV and
VC sequences. The results are taken as evidence that self-monitoring via auditory
feedback is not impaired in people who stutter. In our study, we ask listeners to rate
severity of dysfluency, rather than error, in samples of spontaneous speech, rather
than non-word strings.
3.Continuity between stuttered and normal disfluencies
To some researchers (e.g. Bloodstein, 1970), the difference between the clinical
disorder of stuttering, and “normal” speech disfluency is simply a matter of degree.
Stuttering is recognised by the frequency and severity of syllable-sound repetition.
“There is no test for determining the precise point at which speech repetitions stop
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being ‘normal’ and become ‘stuttering’. We cannot specify where the wall of an igloo
ends and the roof begins. It is not a scientific question” (Bloodstein, 1970).  In order
to strengthen his argument, Bloodstein (1970) describes what he calls the
“Consistency Effect”: the distribution of disfluencies in the speech sequence is
supposedly similar for stutterers and nonstutterers. Cross (n.d.) agrees that a
categorical differentiation between stutterers and nonstutterers is both unnecessary
and invalid, because the nature and degree of the problem vary from one individual to
the next. He concludes that the issue is not whether the person is a stutterer or not, but
whether the form or frequency of speech disruptions interferes with their ability to
convey a message.
However, Perkins (1990) insists that a qualitative categorical distinction does exist
between stutterers’ and nonstutterers’ speech. He suggests that there are two
definitions of stuttering. The observer’s viewpoint corresponds to the continuity
hypothesis, whereas the stutterer’s viewpoint corresponds to a categorical judgement.
According to this perspective, speakers know when they stutter, but listeners can only
guess. So, disfluency in nonstutterers is concerned with the motor control aspects of
speech, whereas disfluency in stutterers seems to involve additional psychological
aspects such as loss of control and feelings of helplessness.
In order to disentangle these views, the current study obtains ratings of fluent and
disfluent speech fragments recorded from dialogues between stutterers and between
nonstutterers.  We should be able to ascertain whether there is a general distinction to
be made between stutterers’ and nonstutterers’ speech, and (based on Levelt’s, 1983,
view of self-monitoring outlined above) whether stutterers perceive a discontinuity
where others perceive a continuum. 
4.The Present Study
The present pilot study investigates the phenomenon of stuttering perceptually, in
contrast to previous work (e.g., Vasic & Wijnen, this volume) which has posited self-
monitoring accounts of stutterers’ speech production.  In the experiment reported in
this chapter, we asked judges who stuttered to rate the fluency or otherwise of short
extracts from recordings made in naturalistic circumstances of dialogues between
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pairs of stuttering participants or pairs of nonstuttering controls.  For each type of
dialogue, half of the extracts were of fluent speech, and half were of mildly disfluent
speech, where the onset of a word was repeated a single time.  We would not expect
either set of judges to rate extracts obtained from dialogues between stutterers as more
disfluent overall than those obtained from nonstutterers’ dialogues; we expect there to
be little or no qualitative difference between the speech of the two groups.  However,
to test Vasic and Wijnen's hypothesis directly, the ratings given by our judges were
compared with those from a second group of judges without stutters.  If Vasic and
Wijnen are correct, the judges who stutter should be more sensitive to disfluency.
This sensitivity could manifest itself in one of two ways: if the judges who stutter
detect and are sensitive to minor infelicities in the fluent speech extracts, we might
expect them to rate these (as well as the disfluent samples) as worse.  On the other
hand, an increased sensitivity to disfluency may make people who stutter likely to
differentiate more between fluent and disfluent speech.
There are two justifications for the approach taken here: firstly, we avoid prejudging
whether disfluent speech should be considered as ‘normal’ or ‘stuttered’, an absolute
distinction which many researchers dispute; and secondly, if we accept Levelt’s view
that the processes responsible for self-monitoring are also responsible for the
processing of others’ speech, we are in a position to directly compare the sensitivities
of stutterers and nonstutterers to disfluencies in speech.  The approach relies on using
a rating system which is sensitive enough to capture small differences in listeners’
perceptions of the fluency of recorded speech.  We have chosen to use Magnitude
Estimation, an approach used increasingly in linguistic studies where fine judgements
are required, which we outline below.
5.Magnitude Estimation
“Until stuttering can be identified qualitatively, we have no way of knowing what it is
we have studied. Empirical evidence is needed to determine the best appropriate
measures” (Perkins, 1995). The technique of Magnitude Estimation promises to be an
extremely useful way of accessing fine judgements about the severity of disfluency in
speech. This method was developed by psychophysicists to make the best use of
participants’ ability to make fine judgements about physical stimuli, and has since
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been used in a number of  linguistic acceptability tasks (Bard et al., 1996; Keller,
2000). Participants are instructed to assign any number to a given stimulus (the
Modulus), and rate the following stimuli proportionately. This can be compared to
traditional ‘Likert Scale’ measures, where participants are asked to assign a number
on a discrete scale (often 1-7).  The disadvantage of such interval scaling is that there
is no way of knowing in advance if people’s sensitivities to the data provided are
limited to a seven-way distinction any more than to a four-way one (Bard et al.,
1996).  In contrast, in Magnitude Estimation, raters’ responses are unconstrained;
categorical judgements can be revealed rather than imposed.  This method has been
demonstrated to result in robust but fine distinctions.  In previous research on
stuttering, it has been argued that Magnitude Estimation has greater construct validity
than other methods (Schiavetti et al., 1983).  Experience with internet studies using
Magnitude Estimation (e.g., Keller & Alexopolou, 2001) demonstrates that it can be
used consistently by untrained readers and listeners.
6.Method
1.Speech Corpora
All stimuli used in the experiment were unedited samples of spontaneous speech
taken from task-oriented dialogues. The HCRC Map Task Corpus (Anderson et al.,
1991) was used as a model. In the map task, both speakers have a similar map and one
speaker (instruction giver) has a route marked on their map, which they have to
describe to the other (follower). Discrepancies between the two maps provide
occasions for discussion and negotiation.  The HCRC Map Task Corpus has proven to
be a rich source of disfluent speech in nonstutterers, both as instruction giver and as
follower (Branigan, Lickley and McKelvie, 1999; Lickley, 2001). 
To provide natural samples of speech by stutterers, 2 dialogues involving two pairs of
speakers who stutter were recorded. The stuttering speakers were recruited with the
help of a local speech and language therapist and a self-help group in Edinburgh.
Recordings took place in a quiet studio, with speakers sitting at tables facing each
other about 5 metres apart, their maps raised on easels at an angle so that neither
participant’s map was visible to the other. Speakers were fitted with clip-on
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microphones and recorded onto separate channels on digital audio tape and SVHS
video tapes.
Nonstuttering control stimuli came from two sources. The first source was the speech
of two speakers from the HCRC corpus itself, which involved speakers with Scottish
accents and was recorded in very similar conditions to the new corpus. These two
speakers provided matches for the stimuli produced by the two Scottish stuttering
speakers. Since the other two stuttering speakers were not Scottish speakers,
nonstuttering speakers with very similar accents were recruited to record another
dialogue, so as to counter any biasing effects of regional accent in the experiment.
The HCRC Map Task Corpus has full transcriptions and disfluency annotation time-
aligned with the digitised speech signal. The new dialogues were transcribed and
annotated for disfluency using signal processing software on Unix workstations.
Disfluency annotation was performed with reference to the HCRC disfluency coding
manual (Lickley, 1998), which was adapted to include disfluencies associated with
stuttering (multiple repetitions, prolongations and blocks). The same software was
used to excise the experimental stimuli from the dialogues into separate files.
2.Stimulus selection
For the purposes of the current study, we attempted to match the stimuli produced by
stutterers with similar stimuli produced by nonstutterers. This strategy meant that the
type of disfluency we could use in stimuli was restricted to a small subset of the types
of disfluency that are produced by people who stutter: single repetitions of part words,
rather than multiple repetitions. While they are a common characteristic of the speech
of people who stutter, multiple repetitions are somewhat rare in the speech of
nonstutterers. In the HCRC Map Task Corpus (described in Anderson et al., 1991),
we find nearly 2000 disfluent repetitions, only 161 of which consist of more than one
repetition and only 19 of more than two. Of these, only 1 is a part-word repetition,
consisting of progressively shorter repetitions of the onset of a 3 syllable word
(undernea- under- und- un- no underneath).
Perceptual studies on non-stuttered speech using non-stuttering listeners suggest that
minor disfluencies such as single part-word repetitions are harder to detect and more
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often missed altogether by listeners than other types of disfluencies (Bard and
Lickley, 1998): non-stutterers, at least, appear to find such disfluencies unobtrusive.
Restricting the stimuli in our study to this type of disfluency has a bearing on our
interpretation of the results. If stutterers are more sensitive even to such minor
disruptions than are nonstutterers, this will serve to emphasise their over-sensitivity
and support the notion that their acceptability threshold for errors is significantly
higher.  In addition, if we find that listeners judge these minor disfluencies differently
for stutterers and nonstutterers, we will have evidence that contradicts the continuity
hypothesis, suggesting that there is a qualitative difference even between the
“normal” disfluencies for the two sets of speakers. 
3.Materials
A total of 64 stimuli were selected from the corpora described above so as to include
sets of 32 disfluent and 32 fluent stimuli. Half of these came from the 4 stuttering
speakers and the other half from 4 nonstutterers. All the disfluent stimuli contained
single repetitions of word onsets. Each stimulus produced by a stutterer was matched
as closely as possible with a stimulus from a nonstutterer with the same regional
accent. Disfluent stimuli were matched for phonetic content of the repeated segment
wherever possible (e.g. “ that s-section” was matched with “ going s-straight up”).
Fluent stimuli were matched for their lexical and syntactic content, as far as possible
(e.g. “ then you go up” was matched with “ then you go straight up”). However,
finding precisely matched controls from a small corpus of spontaneous speech is
virtually impossible. Where such a precise match was not possible, the most liberal
criterion used was that speech segments should be of equivalent length. No patterns
likely to bias experimental outcomes could be detected in the less precisely-matched
stimuli.
One stimulus, a disfluent item produced by a nonstutterer, was selected as modulus,
and headed each of 3 blocks of 21 other stimuli. Apart from this stimulus, the items
were presented in different random orders for each subject.
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4.Subjects
Subjects in the listening experiment consisted of 16 nonstutterers (9 female, 7 male)
and 6 stutterers (1 female, 5 male), with an age range of 20-45. None reported having
hearing deficits. None had previous experience of the task of giving fluency
judgments.
5.Procedure
The experiment was carried out using Psyscope (Cohen et al., 1993) on an Apple
Macintosh computer. Stimuli were played over headphones to subjects seated in
sound-proofed listening booths.
Instructions were presented on the computer screen in several short sections. Subjects
were told that their task was to give a numerical response which matched their
perception of the severity of speech disfluency for each segment of speech that they
heard. They were asked to rate more disfluent segments with higher numbers and less
disfluent segments with lower numbers and to relate their judgments to their score for
the modulus segment. They were encouraged not to base their ratings on anything
other than fluency (e.g. speaker accent, grammaticality) and to respond as quickly as
possible.  Subjects responded by typing their responses on a computer keyboard. The
presentation of stimuli was self-paced: a new stimulus was played when the subject
hit the “return” key on the keyboard.
The experiment was preceded by a practice session to familiarise the subjects with the
magnitude estimation task. The practice session consisted of judgments of tone
duration, rather than line length, which is the measure usually used in magnitude
estimation, in order to maintain the auditory aspect of the experiment.
Following the practice session, subjects performed the experiment without
interruption, typically completing the task in about 15 minutes.  Responses, consisting
of typed numbers corresponding to the three repetitions of the Modulus, together with
63 other comparative ratings, were recorded in data files generated by Psyscope.
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7.RESULTS
Each participant’s ratings were divided by the value they had given to the modulus
stimulus, to make the scores comparable.  Since the ratings were ratios (“how much
more or less fluent than the modulus”) they were then log-transformed.  A
transformed rating of zero thus indicated that the participant had judged a stimulus to
be equivalently fluent to the modulus; scores greater than zero indicated increased
disfluency, and scores less than zero indicated that the stimulus had been rated as
relatively fluent.
The analysis of the transformed scores was however made more difficult by a design
flaw in the study.  Participants rated each modulus three times, but no attention was
drawn by the experimenters to the fact that the two repetitions should be given the
initial modulus rating.  This lack of ‘anchoring’ resulted in an appreciable drift in
participants’ scoring throughout the experiment; of 22 participants in total, only 5
gave the modulus item the same score on all three occasions.  In other words, the
results from 17 participants introduced additional, non-systematic, error variance into
the study (and because the modulus ratings did not appear to change in predictable
ways, there is no obvious way to compensate for this).  The analysis by participants
reflects these problems, and will not be reported here.  However, because the
experimental stimuli were randomised, each stimulus had an equal chance of
occurring early in the experiment (before the onset of drift).  This means that the error
variance due to drift should be approximately equally partitioned across items, and a
by-items analysis can be used to give a clearer picture of the outcome of the
experiment.
The analysis reported here included the (matched) stimuli as a random factor, and
explored the effects of rater (with or without stutter), speaker (with or without stutter),
and type of utterance (fluent or disfluent) as within-item factors.  All means reported
are of log-transformed adjusted ratings.
Note that we can consider the stimuli used in this experiment to be a subset of the infinite
population of comparable disfluencies.  Thus a by-items analysis does not fall subject to the
criticism of  Raaijmakers, Schrijnemakers and Gremmen (1999).
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Only two of the variables had independent effects: unsurprisingly, disfluent utterances
were judged to be more disfluent than fluent utterances (0.10 vs. -0.57; F(1,15) =
153.17, p < .001); and speakers with stutters were rated slightly less fluent overall
(0.13 vs. -0.34; F(1,15) = 7.29, p = 0.003).  There was no independent effect of rater
(that is, raters appeared to use similar ranges of scores, whether or not they had
stutters themselves).  Interestingly, there was no interaction between speaker and
utterance type, suggesting that disfluent or fluent utterances from speakers with
stutters were perceived equivalently to similar utterances from nonstuttering speakers;
the interaction between speaker and rater, and the three-way interaction, also failed to
reach significance.
However, the interaction between rater and utterance type did reach significance
(F(1,15) = 23.41, p < 0.001).  As can be seen from figure 1, this reflects the fact that
raters with stutters differentiated more between disfluent and fluent utterances than
did raters without stutters, suggesting that people with stutters discriminate more
sensitively between fluent and disfluent speech.  We return to this point in the
discussion.
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Figure 1: Mean transformed ratings of fluent and disfluent utterances
by raters with and without stutters.
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9.Discussion
It is widely agreed that despite the inclusiveness of the label, people who are
described as, or describe themselves as, stutterers often display very different
symptoms and coping strategies.  In this context, results from a small-scale study such
as that reported here need to be treated with caution: it is too early to make any claims
about a single cause of stuttering.  However, taken together with the studies reported
by Vasic and Wijnen, the findings from the present study converge to implicate the
self-monitor in stuttering.  In a direct test of sensitivity to disfluency, stutterers were
found to differentiate more between disfluent and fluent speech than nonstutterers,
regardless of whether that speech had been originally uttered by someone considered
to have a stutter or someone who was a nonstutterer.  This evidence is consistent with
one interpretation of  Vasic and Wijnen's hypothesis.  It would be premature however
to conclude that people who stutter do not rate fluent speech as worse; given the small
numbers of participants, comparisons of absolute ratings between groups must be
treated with caution.  However, the evidence clearly indicates a difference in relative
ratings, consistent with either version of the hypothesis; further, we can assume that
since participants were explicitly instructed to rate the recordings for fluency, the
focus and cognitive effort devoted to the task were maximised, and have little role to
play in the outcome.
In contrast, it is important to note that the continuity hypothesis was not directly
supported: excerpts from dialogues between stuttering participants were rated as
worse than those from nonstutterers, regardless of whether they were fluent or not,
and regardless of who was doing the rating.  In fact, there is evidence that both the
disfluent and the fluent speech of stutterers may involve abnormal motor activity,
both in laryngeal dynamics (e.g., Adams et al., 1985) and in the supralaryngeal organs
(Wood, 1995). Using electropalatography, Wood found that stutterers produced
greater degrees of lingual-palatal contact while producing alveolar plosives in fluent
speech than did nonstutterers. It seems likely that such indications of muscular tension
in the speech production apparatus (for example “hard contacts” in Van Riper’s
14
(1982) terms) may be perceptible to listeners.  If they were present in our
experimental materials, subjects may have reflected this in their fluency judgements.
In itself, this supposition does not contradict a self-monitor based explanation of
stuttering: sensitivity to the likelihood of stuttering, and a hypersensitivity to potential
repairs, may be reflected in motor activity.
The study reported here is also limited in that it only addresses onset repetitions: one
of several symptoms associated with stuttering.  One reason for investigating
repetitions first is because the silent interval can be measured objectively, and can
therefore be used as a reliable measure of stuttering for clinicians (stutterers tend to
have a shorter silent interval).  Although Wijnen (2000) argues that the Vicious Circle
hypothesis also applies to other symptoms such as prolongations and blocks, further
research is needed before we are able to rule out counterexplanations of these
manifestations.  Another limitation is the number of subjects in this study: we are
addressing this in a larger study currently nearing completion.
In contrast to the more ‘objective’ view presented here, Perkins (1995) claims that it
is the speaker’s feelings of loss of control over their speech that truly defines
stuttering, rather than particular types or frequencies of disfluencies.  He argues that
taking averages of averages and trying to obtain a quantitative description of an
essentially qualititative issue loses most of the sensitivity and original quality of the
data. The issue of subjectivity is of crucial importance in this area of research – to
what extent can the diverse speech behaviour of stutterers be quantified in controlled
experiments?  We would contend that using a sufficiently sensitive task such as
Magnitude Estimation avoids some of the pitfalls that Perkins envisages, and allows
us to make important insights into the nature of stuttering.  This approach has little to
say about the pathology of stuttering (as yet, there is no account of what causes
hypersensitivity in the self-monitor), but much to say about its manifestation, and by
implication, about some possible therapeutic approaches.  In particular, the findings
reported here and in Vasic and Wijnen’s earlier chapter suggest that stuttering may be
ameliorated by encouraging clients to tolerate, rather than attempt to avoid, the speech
errors that all speakers are prone to make.
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